In this paper we use the long-term empirical relationship among primary energy consumption, real income, physical capital, population and technology, obtained by averaged panel error correction models, to project the long-term primary energy consumption of 56 countries up to 2100. In forecasting long-term primary energy consumption, we work with four different Shared Socioeconomic Pathway Scenarios (SSPs) developed for the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) framework, assuming different challenges to adaptation and mitigation. We find that in all scenarios, China, the United States and India will be the largest energy consumers, while highly growing countries will also significantly contribute to energy use. We observe for most scenarios a sharp increase in global energy consumption, followed by a levelling-out and a decrease towards the second half of the century. The reasons behind this pattern are not only slower population growth, but also infrastructure saturation and increased total factor productivity. This means, as countries move towards more knowledge based societies, and higher energy efficiency, their primary energy usage is likely to decrease as a result. Global primary energy consumption is expected however to increase significantly in the coming decades, thus increasing the pressure on policy makers to cope with the questions of energy security and greenhouse gas mitigation at the same time.
Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to project the long-term worldwide primary energy consumption up to 2100, based on averaged panel error correction estimates, designed to decrease the inherent a The authors are grateful to Jesús Crespo Cuaresma and Helmuth Böck for advice and suggestions. All remaining errors are ours. Projecting Long-Term Primary Energy Consumption of macroeconomic variables including primary energy, secondary energy, population, GDP, energy security to be projected on the long-run. Besides the economic variables, IIASA projects the key environmental variables such as air pollutants, greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and radiative forcing with the help of the MESSAGE and IMAGE modelling systems. Interestingly, the International Monetary Fund's World Economic Outlook (International Monetary Fund 2011) also deals with resource constraints and considers the impacts of oil scarcity on economic output.
Forecasting energy consumption is a highly important task that -in any case -is carried out with high uncertainty. Therefore most of the forecast do not venture beyond a scope of 20 maximum 30 years, giving thus little insights about longer term implications. This paper attempts a longer horizon energy projection up to 2100, allowing for different scenarios based on the shared socioeconomic pathways (SSPs) developed by the IPCC working group (Kriegler et al. 2010 ) for population and real income. We also conduct a geopolitical analysis of energy and technological development. The effects of greenhouse gas emissions from increasing energy consumption might, according to various studies (Stern 2007) contribute to increased famine, adverse weather conditions, increasing sea levels and the associated economic costs. Therefore the right choice of energy sources used to meet growing energy demand will be of crucial importance, especially if energy use patterns are identifiable and connectible to a given level of economic development (Jakob, Haller, and Marschinski 2012) .
In comparing our projections with the major studies from above, we receive very similar midterm results as the International Energy Agency (2011), or IIASA, projecting up to 45% increase of primary energy consumption by 2035. We do find that after a previous increase in energy consumption, primary energy demand for our sample set is likely to level and to slowly decrease in the second half of the century. This is not only attributable to lower population growth, but also to infrastructure saturation, and to increased total factor productivity. We also find that presently developing countries are likely to go through similar patterns of energy consumption as industrialized countries did, and a decrease in energy consumption levels is only likely after a change in the structure of the economy. Therefore, in order to cope with the challenges caused by the high energy usage, shifting to cleaner (reduced or no greenhouse gases and particle emissions), economic and concentrated energy sources, such as natural gas, renewables or nuclear energy would be advisable. This paper is organised as follows: Section 2 introduces the data and the applied methodology.
Section 3 elaborates on the results, while Section 4 concludes. Detailed energy projection tables can be found in Section 5, the Annex.
Data and Methodology

The Model
The aim of this paper is to project primary energy consumption, which we denote in million tons of oil equivalent, after the unit of measurement of British Petrol (British Petrol 2011b). We work with averaged coefficient estimates of 33 panel error correction models, gained using a panel sample of 64 countries. The primary energy consumption of our sample countries with 10552
MTOE constitutes approximately 94.5% of the worldwide total, as of (British Petrol 2011b .
Each state in this sample was assigned into a set of nine panel error correction models, three basic composition models (E.YL, E.LK, E.LKA), and three attribute models (world, regional and wealth level).
The panel error correction equations estimated were:
1. The EC model of primary energy consumption on GDP and on population (E.YL) 
In our notation, E is the primary energy consumption, Y is real income, L is the total population, K is the physical capital calculated with the perpetual inventory method, and A is the total factor productivity computed as the Solow residual. A total of 33 models were estimated in Csereklyei and Humer (2012) , where regional groups included Asia & Pacific (AS), Eastern Europe & Eurasia (EE), Middle East & Africa (ME), North America (NA), South America & Mexico (SA) and Western Europe (WE), while the gross domestic product per capita groups accounting for
After carrying out our estimations, we observe significant parameter heterogeneity in the long-term cointegrating coefficients, caused by the different stages of economic development and geopolitics (Csereklyei and Humer 2012). These results might raise the question of proper model choice to conduct projections, as these energy forecasts will depend on the coefficients of the selected model. In our approach however, instead of selecting a single model, we decided to deploy simple model averaging techniques, in an attempt to reduce the above model uncertainty.
Model averaging can be seen as a frequently used alternative to model selection, as described by Raftery (1995) and Hoeting, Madigan, Raftery, and Volinsky (1999) . For the purpose of forecasting, this means not relying on the parameters of a specific model but to pool forecasts over a group of models. It has been shown by Fernandez, Ley, and M. F. Steel (2001) ; Ley and M. F. Steel (2009); Min and Zellner (1993); Raftery, Madigan, and Hoeting (1997) and M. Steel (2011) that weighting the models by a measure of model fit leads to better out-of-sample forecast performance. We have, in Csereklyei and Humer (2012) also proven for our sample that the out-of-sample rolling forecast performance of a model with the averaged long-term coefficients has a significantly better out-of-sample predicting ability than any single individual model.
For the purpose of averaging, the cointegrating coefficients stemming from the six regional groups for each structural model (E.YL, E.LK, E.LKA) are aggregated into one regional model, weighted proportional to the number of observations in the regional groups. The coefficients from the income per capita level group are aggregated similarly, until we have only one real income per capita model for each of the three structural variants). Since the model averaging in Csereklyei and Humer (2012) could be performed on only 45 countries due to the insufficient length of the Eastern European and partially of the Middle Eastern and Africa dataset, we re-estimate the averaged coefficients for the purpose of the projections. We use thus the results from all 64 countries and 6 regions, but weigh the parameter estimates of the 3 × 3 aggregate panel error correction models with the weights obtained on 45 models, as in Csereklyei and Humer (2012) .
This way we include the coefficients of the Eastern European region as well, enabling thus more accurate projections for the former Eastern Block countries. The model weights calculated in Csereklyei and Humer (2012) assigned the highest weights respectively to models with the highest out-of-sample predicting ability, and after the work of Sala-i-Martin, Doppelhofer, and Miller (2004) to models with the best in-sample fit. The results are presented in Table 1 . After the inclusion of the EE and ME regions into the averaging procedure, the averaged cointegration coefficients gained with the 64 countries are found in Table 2 . M ξ -0.056 13.520 -0.093 -1.505 -0.120 0.067 SSE -0.057 13.638 -0.100 -1.536 -0.101 0.060 * Source: Own Calculation, α: error correction coefficient, β 1 : long-term coefficient on GDP, β 2 : long-term coefficient on population, β 3 : long-term coefficient on physical capital, β 4 :long-term coefficient on total factor productivity.
Next, we project the primary energy consumption, by utilising the long-run coefficient averages Projecting Long-Term Primary Energy Consumption from above. To account for the uncertainty arising from varying macroeconomic developments, we use pro country four different macroeconomic scenarios (shared socioeconomic pathways), as defined in Kriegler et al. (2010) . Thus, the number of models estimated pro country will be 4 × 2, sufficiently reflecting the inherent uncertainty in forecasting.
Data
We source the population (L), and the real income (Y) values for each of the four shared socioeconomic pathway (SPP) scenarios from the GDP projections of the IIASA (2012b), running from 2010 to 2100. The sample size for the projections is decreased to 56 countries however, due to the availability of real income and population forecasts 1 .
The assumptions regarding population and economic development can be seen in the Annex.
The four SSPs are defined as in Kriegler et al. (2010) , and chosen to reflect scenarios with different worldwide challenges for adaptation and mitigation. Simply put, socioeconomic changes to mitigation include factors that tend to lead to high reference emissions in the absence of climate policies, and factors that would tend to reduce the inherent mitigate capacity of a society. On the other hand, socioeconomic challenges to adaptation are societal conditions that increase the risk associated with any given climate change scenario (Kriegler et al. 2010) . High reference emissions can be caused according to Kriegler et al. (2010) by a number of factors, such as high population growth, rapid economic growth, energy intensive economic systems, or carbon intensive energy supplies.
In this study we work first with the SSP1 scenario, assuming reasonable mitigation and adaptation capability, with high rate of development and lessened inequalities. Rapid technological change and environmentally friendly energy resource use are assumed. Its opposite, the SSP3 scenario, on the other hand models a world with large challenges to both mitigation and adaptation. One manifestation would be very high population growth and large unmitigated emissions, coupled with slow technological change in the energy sector. In this world, investments in human capital are low and inequality is high, with institutional development leaving many people vulnerable to the aftermath of climate change. The SSP2 scenario is an intermediate case between the two extremes above (Kriegler et al. 2010) . The last scenario we consider is the SSP5 scenario narrating a world with large challenges to mitigation but with adequate capabilities to adapt. An example would be high energy demand, which is met with fossil resources, thus creating high emissions. At the same time quick economic development strengthens institutions and investments in human capital are growing, which in turn reduces inequalities and population growth. This leads finally to reductions in energy consumption. (Kriegler et al. 2010) . The assumed development of the sample population can be seen in Figure 1 . Accordingly, the projected population is the highest in the SSP3 scenario, while the lowest in the SSP1 and SSP5 cases accordingly, with SSP2 presenting the middle way. As we can see, population is expected to peak around 2040-2060 for our sample, then slightly decreases in most scenarios. Similarly, as expected the growth rate of real income is modelled to be the highest for the SSP5 case, followed by SSP1 and SSP2, while the lowest in the SSP3 scenario. The real income scenarios were estimated with an econometric model implying that the growth rate of total output (Y) depends on the growth rate of each one of the factors of production (total factor productivity, physical capital, and of different subpopulations, divided into age and education level). 2 The GDP development of our sample countries can be seen in Figure 2 .
The series were interpolated as in Stineman (1980) between the five year non-overlapping intervals. The physical capital (K) series is calculated using the perpetual inventory method by Bernanke and Gurkaynak (2001) . The starting capital stock was taken from our 2009 values, available in Csereklyei and Humer (2012) . Afterwards, the series was constructed as:
2 The model estimated is gY = λ log(
∑ 3 k=0 β jk gL jk , where gX is the growth rate of variable X over the given period and all variables which are not growth rates are measured at the initial year of the considered 5 year period. Country-specific effects and period fixed effects (which we interpret as overall movements in the technology frontier that are independent of those caused by the variables of the model) are included (IIASA 2012c). Another necessary assumption involves the development in the investment share of income (k i ), which is used to calculate the annual investments (I), as a percentage of real income. Since k i is a stationary, but very highly persistent variable, we have taken into account past trends in investment shares when projecting this series. For developed countries with an investment share around 20-25% we have reduced the expected values to 20% fast, while the k i of presently developing countries was kept for a few decades high, following the pattern of earlier developments, then slowly reduced to the level of Western industrialised countries around the middle of the 21st century. As these countries will move towards more knowledge based GDP creation in the future, the investment share of GDP is likely to decrease. Based on the above we have constructed our dataset. The total factor productivity variable (A) was calculated as in Csereklyei and Humer (2012) , as the Solow residual.
Results
In interpreting and analysing the results of this paper, we have to keep in mind first the inherent uncertainty regarding projections in general. Although we attempt to cover a wide range of scenarios based on differing assumptions, neither grave technological breakthroughs, wars, geopolitical conflicts, or other major events can be considered that might change the course and the pattern of the future drastically. The sample set of 56 countries does not cover the entire world. The primary energy consumption of our reduced sample set as of 2009 totalled approximately 10,225.20 MTOE, which constitutes based on the BP database about 89.9% of the worldwide usage. As other developing countries will grow both demographically and economically, the energy consumption in these regions is also likely to speed up. Therefore, we expect the total worldwide energy demand to be higher than our projections. Also, the pattern of energy consumption might also shift, as African, Middle East and South-Asian countries embark on a higher growth period.
Projecting long-term energy consumption
The energy projections in this section are gained by applying the long-term cointegrating relationships to the different shared socioeconomic pathway assumptions. The determinants of primary energy usage in our models are thus real income, population development, physical capital and technology. We work with the coefficients obtained through the averaging of our nine basic models.
The final parameter estimates on the drivers of energy consumption are thus determined by the specification of the model (E.YL, E.LK, E.LKA), the weights determined based on the performance of out-of-sample rolling forecasts, applied to the conditional on inclusion coefficients. The major driver of primary energy usage is thus in our specific case the population development, and a positive but lesser effect is carried by physical capital and real income increases. A crucial factor in decreasing primary energy consumption are technological improvements. As mentioned before, we model technology (A), as the Solow residual. This residual however may not only capture energy efficiency improvements, innovations, but also changes in the structure of economies and a move towards more service income in GDP generation. It is very difficult to decompose the components of total factor productivity, as all of the above factors work in the same direction. Present literature expects the presence of massive energy efficiencies (ExxonMobile 2012; International Energy Agency 2011) in the future.
How much total factor productivity will decrease primary energy consumption in our forecasts depends on the population and real income scenarios we draw upon for our projections. In all four scenarios, China, India and the United States are the highest energy consumers in the current century. The increases in total factor productivity however, in case of the United States are significantly lower than in case of India or China based on the IIASA dataset. While we recognise that this assumption limits the impact of TFP gravely in the US projections, we also note that contrary to these, both the United States Energy Information Administration (2012) and large energy companies such as ExxonMobile (2012) expect very low increase in US energy demand and even the lowering of energy demand up to 2035-40, which development is attributed mostly to improvements in energy efficiencies. The long-term energy projections for our sample countries can be seen in Figure 3 .
The rapidly increasing energy demand up to the middle of the century is mostly driven by Table 3 and in Table   4 . The SSP1 scenario, being the so called best case from a climate change point of view assumes reasonable mitigation and adaptation capabilities, with quick economic development and lowered inequalities. Also, the rate of total factor productivity increase is as expected high, dimming energy consumption for all regions.
When comparing SSP1 results to the other socioeconomic scenarios, we see that worldwide primary energy consumption is the lowest at all points in time. One interesting result is that while developing countries (mainly low income per capita countries) show lower primary energy use as in other cases, high income per capita countries, such as the Western European or the North American region show higher energy consumption in this scenario as in the SSP3 version.
The reason for this development is that while both real income growth and technology growth is higher in the first scenario, the positive impact of income growth for developed countries is not compensated by the total factor productivity increases.
Contrary to the first case, the SSP3 scenario, or the worst case picture models a world with large challenges to both mitigation and adaptation. This case assumes high population growth Pathways up to 2100, based on weights gained by the out-of-sample rolling forecast performance of the models.
and large unmitigated emissions, as well as slow technological advancement in the energy sector.
As expected, total primary energy use is the highest in our SSP3 scenario while SSP2 shows an intermediate energy demand between the two extremes.
The SSP5 scenario depicts a world with large challenges to mitigation but with adequate capabilities to adapt. High energy demand is coupled with quick economic development, but also with large investments in human capital, which as a consequence lessen inequalities and reduce population growth. This effect leads finally to reductions in energy consumption. As expected primary energy consumption is the lowest in the SSP5 scenario after the SSP1 scenario.
Based on our simulations, except for the worst case scenario, energy consumption begins to decline for our sample around 2060. When asking the question whether countries in similar phases of economic development have similar energy use patterns, our answer would be, only Pathways up to 2100, based on weights gained by the in-sample fit of the models.
if they experience similar population growth, and their in economic growth will be similarly physical capital driven. Leapfrogging to more efficient and modern technologies in developing countries appears unlikely, especially in regions with very low nominal price levels or where basic infrastructure is missing. Only after the heavy investments in physical capital are decreasing due to infrastructure saturation, inequalities are lessened and the income per capita is increasing, will energy consumption begin to decline due to the structure of the economy, and at the same time, more expensive and efficient technologies are likely to gain share. Simultaneously, this development also reduces energy consumption through slowing population levels, and slowing energy intensive capital increase. A decomposition of regional energy consumption growth can be seen in Figure 4 .
As mentioned earlier, we only model countries with uniformly available energy consumption This picture might be different by 2100 if large parts of Africa, and the Middle East pick up on economic and population development, and consequently on energy consumption. We would, in this case also except a similar development of consumption levels, with steep increases as population and economic speed up, a saturation decades later, followed by a slow decline.
Although it is not a universal phenomenon, yet often governments of developing countries subsidise energy in order not to harm economic development. Most of these subsidies (gas in Russia, oil in the Middle East, coal in China) are presently oriented at fossil fuels and are seen not only as a way of subsidising economic growth, but also a necessity to avoid social unrest. As most of the future energy consumption increase is expected from developing countries, this practice might have long-reaching consequences from a greenhouse gas emissions point of view. Some of these countries however, most notably China, have agreed to limit greenhouse gas emissions in the future. This is mostly possible through the very stable state budget and financing possibilities China possess at the moment.
Comparing our results (+ max 45.7% increase in primary energy consumption by 2035) with those of the IEA (using a bottom-up integrated modelling approach), our projections are very similar to the IEA current policies (+49,8%) and new policies (+40,9%) scenario as of 2035. We note here that the total energy consumption defined by the IEA as of 2009 was 12032 MTOE compared to the BP data of 11363 MTOE. Matching our results with the IIASA long-run projections, we are also well within the range of their possible scenarios. While the IIASA projections do not show a downward trend after 2060, this is likely attributable to the inclusion of presently developing countries in later years. One modelling discrepancy that we take note of is, as mentioned our North America model, where the expected gains in energy efficiency by the US EIA and Exxon are larger than those in our simulation.
The geopolitics of energy: an outlook
The share of the different energy forms is particularly difficult to predict for the future. States is a very effective tool to greatly enhance energy security, and perhaps even to become an exporter of natural gas instead of importer. Next to the human knowledge and technological advancements one of the key enabling factor of shale gas development was the resource ownership rights in the US, which incentivises private investment, and gravely reduces resistance against the resource extraction. This, in turn significantly reduces gas prices, making heavily energy intensive industries gaining on competitive edge. From the present perspective -at least in North America, the future belongs to fossil fuels, most likely to unconventional gas and perhaps unconventional oil resources.
At the same time, on the other side of the globe, Russia, which harboured earlier plans to build natural gas pipelines not only to China but perhaps to the Kamchatka Sea to supply LNG to North America, had to rethink those plans as a result of the very fast shale development in the United States. Gas consumer prices are presently one of the lowest in the world in Russia, mainly due to the local subsidies. At the same time, as Russia coupled its long-term gas supply contracts to the price of oil, the revenues from hydrocarbon exports have been continuously
rising from approximately 2% in 1995 to about 50% during the last 15 years (Cohen 2012), making the country immensely depend on its resource exports. This might turn out to be a suboptimal way of budget financing, especially since European Union antitrust laws are giving problems to the Russian state owned gas companies, which try to diversify towards China and the rest of Asia (Cohen 2012). How the Russian energy future looks is questionable. Russia has definitely abundant hydrocarbon resources (even without the North Pole extractions), and is further enhancing also nuclear technologies. The International Energy Agency (2011) mentions that Russia would certainly need more energy efficiency at home, a process that is not at all encouraged by low gas prices. A vital issue, Russia will have to consider when preparing future budgets, is a China or a Europe developing own shale gas operations. Are China, or Europe then likely to start shale gas extraction in the foreseeable future? In our opinion China has all possibilities to do so. It has a strong central government, the necessary means to build infrastructure, coordinate the operations and most importantly a pressing need for energy. Also, concerning other energy forms, China has taken a very pragmatic and standardised approach. It is presently building a large number of modern nuclear power plants, with even more in their pipeline to come. Nuclear energy is clean, concentrated and provides energy security for a long term. The problem of waste could be dealt with on the long-term, by prospective technologies such as fast burners. The answer to the question why China and other Asian states are building in the first place nuclear power plants, and why they can build them so fast and cheap, is economies of scale, standardisation, stable political environment regarding nuclear energy, and a national energy strategy, that is being followed with large financing coming from the state itself.
As the United States Energy Information Administration (2012) Europe is a special marketplace with constantly growing energy insecurity and dependence on imports. There have been in the past widespread sentiments against a range of energy technologies such as nuclear, shale gas, or even wind energy across Europe. Coping with public pressure is one main determinants of energy policy in many European states, a factor, other governments are not necessarily facing. At the moment the future of European energy hopefully lies in renewables, with laws and heavy state subsidies supporting these. Unfortunately, most renewable technologies in Europe would not be able to survive on the market without these subsidies, even though the price of the competing natural gas is 5-8 times higher than in Russia or in North America (Lewis, Economides, and Ajao 2012). The best case scenario could be, to reach economies of scale for certain renewable technologies, so that the price of energy could to a great extent reduce. Whether Conventional and unconventional oil sources will likely continue to be the major source of energy for the transportation sector in the coming years. However due to the increasing difficulty in oil production, cheap oil seems to be of the phenomenon of the past, save for the Middle East, where oil is subsidised by governments or ruler families in the context of a social contract with the population. As mentioned earlier, it is very difficult to predict what new technologies may arise or if a breakthrough might change the energy landscape of the future. It also remains to be seen, if presently expected high degree energy efficiencies could be reached, massively dimming energy consumption in the future in developed countries.
Due to significantly increasing energy consumption of the next decades, the world will face increased greenhouse gas emissions as well as the accompanying climate change. Therefore the usage of cleaner, cheap and concentrated energy sources such as natural gas, nuclear technologies and renewables would be crucial, to-at least-limit the extent of the impending greenhouse gas emissions.
Conclusion
Projecting long-term energy consumption is a vital task, that is surrounded with much uncertainty. Meeting energy demand is not only crucial to enable economic development of a country, but is a factor of national security, and is highly influenced by the geopolitical situation. In this paper we use the long-term cointegrating coefficients between primary energy consumption, real income, capital, population and technology, obtained by averaged panel error correction parameters, to project the the long-term primary energy consumption of 56 countries up to 2100. In forecasting long-term primary energy consumption, we work with four different Shared Socioeconomic Pathway Scenarios (SSPs) developed for the IPCC framework, assuming different challenges to adaptation and mitigation. We find that in all scenarios, China, the United States and India will be the largest energy consumers, while highly growing countries will also significantly contribute to energy use.
We observe for our dataset for most scenarios a sharp increase in global energy consumption, followed by a levelling-out and a decrease towards the second half of the century. The reasons behind this pattern are not only slower population growth, but also infrastructure saturation, and increased total factor productivity. This means, as countries move towards more knowledge based ac.at/web-apps/ene/SspDb/dsd?Action=htmlpage&page=about.
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